One Must Imagine Sisyphus Happy: Geo-Epistemology in the Arctic

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Orbis et Globus, symbolizing cycles in Arctic knowledge and geopolitics. Photo: Andrii Gladii

The Arctic Institute Knowledge Production Series 2025

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In The Myth of Sisyphus,¹⁾Camus A (1942). Le Mythe de Sisyphe. Paris: Gallimard. Albert Camus presents Sisyphus as a metaphor for the futility of repetitive actions, endlessly rolling a boulder uphill. This paper uses the Sisyphus metaphor to highlight the cyclical, often unchallenged assumptions in International Relations (IR), especially regarding how knowledge is produced, transmitted, and legitimized. Focusing on geo-epistemology in the Arctic, the paper critically examines the symbolic and discursive dichotomies embedded in the Arctic Council’s process for assessing non-Arctic states’ observer applications. Drawing from constructivist IR and epistemological critique, this analysis exposes the persistence of Western-centric modes of validation in Arctic governance. The ambiguity surrounding what constitutes “relevant knowledge” or “expertise” remains unresolved, despite a growing body of literature on the Arctic Council’s observer criteria. By engaging with cases such as Turkey, this article contributes to expanding the geo-epistemological debate, arguing for greater reflexivity in how Arctic knowledge regimes are constructed and challenged.

Geo-Epistemology and the Arctic

Geo-epistemology refers to knowledge and discourses formed in specific spaces and grounded in spatial thinking. This paper critiques geo-epistemology in the Arctic, drawing on Foucauldian thought to emphasize that space itself is also shaped by knowledge, power, and discourses.²⁾Foucault M (1984b). Space, knowledge, and power, in Rabinów, P. (ed.): The Foucault Reader. New York: Pantheon, pp. 239-256. This paper confronts the imperial perspective inherent in chronologies and historization, recognizing it as a dominant paradigm and hegemonic discourse that privileges certain narratives while marginalizing others.³⁾Gramsci A (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. New York: International Publishers; Canaparo C (2010). Geo-epistemology : Latin America and the Location of Knowledge. Oxford: Peter Lang. This Eurocentric framework deeply embedded within Western/European academic institutions, perpetuates geo-epistemological hierarchies that uphold monopolies of knowledge.

International Relations categorizes world politics by using location-based references, such as the Western/non-Western, global North/global South, domestic/foreign or national/international divide.⁴⁾Barkawi T & Murray C & Zarakol A (2023). The United Nations of IR: power, knowledge, and empire in Global IR debates, International Theory, 15(3): 445–461. Classic IR then relies on binaries, which is one of the major criticisms to its geo-epistemological stance.

Geographical classifications are particularly prominent in the Arctic, where the distinction between Arctic and non-Arctic states is deeply ingrained. This binary framework is reinforced consistently in academic and political gatherings, publications, and everyday discussions. Such categorization often ties knowledge exclusively to specific geographic locations, emphasizing boundaries rather than recognizing the transnational and transdisciplinary origins of expertise. There is no doubt that scientists from Arctic countries perceive, experience, and understand facts and situations that non-Arctic scientists cannot. However, the reverse is also true. Non-Arctic scientists may -though not always- possess a certain distance from the Arctic that allows them to perceive different realities, consider alternative approaches, or arrive at distinct findings. This is even the case between Arctic cities, Oslo-Moscow relations are different from Kirkenes-Murmansk relations regarding the Arctic.

This division and geo-epistemological hierarchy marginalizes the expertise of non-Arctic experts. But more importantly, it limits Indigenous participation in Arctic affairs.⁵⁾Ellam Y, Raymond-Yakoubian J, Aluaq D & Behe C (2022). A framework for co-production of knowledge in the context of Arctic research, Ecology and Society, 27(1):34 In these binaries, the state is the central actor in decision-making process on defining what knowledge is relevant or not.⁶⁾Ellam Y, Raymond-Yakoubian J, Aluaq D & Behe C (2022). A framework for co-production of knowledge in the context of Arctic research, Ecology and Society, 27(1):34 Criticisms persist regarding the inclusion of Indigenous voices in decision-making processes, both within their respective countries and in forums like the Arctic Council.⁷⁾Rottem S. V (2020). The Arctic Council: Between Environmental Protection and Geopolitics, Singapore: Palgrave. For instance, when the Arctic Council suspended cooperation with Russia in 2022, the decision was made solely by the seven Arctic states.

In examples of Arctic-specific programs, the exclusivity of organizations such as the Arctic Council or Arctic Economic Council internships and the Arctic Fulbright Initiative to citizens of the eight Arctic states highlights a monopolization of knowledge and specialization confined to these states’ citizens. This exclusivity, while potentially fostering regional expertise, also limits diverse perspectives and hinders the globalization of Arctic knowledge. Consequently, it contributes to an endogenous epistemology, where knowledge production in the Arctic predominantly relies on literature narrowly focused on the Arctic context. Furthermore, this exclusivity not only restricts the globalization of Arctic knowledge but also raises questions about how the Arctic is geographically and conceptually defined. For instance, while an American citizen from Hawaii is naturally eligible for Arctic expertise, an Estonian citizen living in Tromsø is excluded by the imaginary boundaries drawn, thereby narrowing the field of expertise.

Spatial thinking plays an important role in defining geo-epistemological thinking, which informs the location of knowledge. In the Arctic Council, there are criteria used to assess the suitability of applicants as observer states.⁸⁾Rottem S. V (2020). The Arctic Council: Between Environmental Protection and Geopolitics, Singapore: Palgrave. First, observers must acknowledge the legal framework of the Arctic governance and the sovereignty of eight Arctic states and must possess relevant Arctic expertise—a term that remains somewhat ambiguous and may benefit from further clarification due to its broad scope.⁹⁾Knecht S (2020). The Arctic Council, Asian Observers and the Role of Shadow Networks in the Science-Policy Interface, in Observing the Arctic: Asian in the Arctic Council and Beyond, ed. Woon C. Y & Dodds K. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Moreover, observers are expected to contribute to strengthening the work of the permanent participants, though how this impact is measured is not clearly defined. It remains unclear exactly how the impact of their contributions can be measured.¹⁰⁾Knecht S (2020). The Arctic Council, Asian Observers and the Role of Shadow Networks in the Science-Policy Interface, in Observing the Arctic: Asian in the Arctic Council and Beyond, ed. Woon C. Y & Dodds K. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

This situation seems to reinforce the Arctic Council’s commitment to preserving an Arctic core of the eight Arctic states and their relationships with permanent participants.¹¹⁾Knecht S (2020). The Arctic Council, Asian Observers and the Role of Shadow Networks in the Science-Policy Interface, in Observing the Arctic: Asian in the Arctic Council and Beyond, ed. Woon C. Y & Dodds K. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Knecht notes that observers remain as mere observers within the Council’s governance. Kankaanpää and Young, on the other hand, highlights a significant gap between observers’ aspirations and the reality within the Arctic Council, with minimal evidence to counter the claim that “the Arctic Council has not effectively integrated non-Arctic experts into its projects.”¹²⁾Kankaanpää P & Young O (2012). The effectiveness of the Arctic Council, Polar Research: 75.

Monopolies of Knowledge and Power in the Arctic

The concept of monopolies of knowledge, first proposed by Canadian economic historian Harold Innis in the context of communication, highlights how dominant classes maintain political power by controlling fundamental communication technologies.¹³⁾Innis H (1951). The Bias of Communication, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Innis suggests that monopolies of knowledge emerge when established hierarchies become rigid and disconnected from social realities, hindering the development of new ways of thinking. In the Arctic Council, holding the essential power to evaluate what counts as expertise aligns with the ambiguous assessment process of what is considered “relevant knowledge.” The term “relevant” has, in a sense, become a buzzword, highly open to interpretation, leading to the production not to the knowledge we need but to the knowledge we desire.

The Arctic Council itself embodies the geopolitical discourse surrounding the Arctic, where ostensibly objective binaries shape spatial imaginaries that prioritize certain types of expertise while marginalizing others. Monopolies of knowledge, in this context, can contribute to a separation between the evaluation of Arctic and non-Arctic knowledge, as such monopolies favor centralization of power. Those who control knowledge ultimately possess the power to define what is to be governed.

Applications for Observer Status from 2015 to 2021

In 2021, Ireland, Czech Republic, and Estonia applied for observer status in the Arctic Council but were rejected.¹⁴⁾High North News (2021) Arctic Council Disagreement Defers Observer Status Decision, High North News, 26 May, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/arctic-council-disagreement-defers-observer-status-decision. Accessed on 16 December 2024. Each of these countries had prepared detailed applications to align with the Arctic Council’s fields of interest; however, there is not any official explanation regarding the rejections, which raises questions about the Arctic Council’s hesitations toward expansion.¹⁵⁾Kirchner S (2021). The End of Expansion? The Arctic Council after Estonia’s Failed Bid for Observer Status. ENTER Policy Brief, 2021(9). https://foreignpolicynewrealities.eu/publications/cost-action-enter-policy-brief-no-9/. Accessed on 16 December 2024. Filimonova et al. also mention that all these applicant states are NATO members (Czech Republic, Estonia) or individual partner countries (Ireland), and their applications may have faced opposition from Russia, which is resistant to NATO-aligned states.¹⁶⁾Filimonova N & Obydenkova A & Rodrigues V (2023). Geopolitical and economic interests in environmental governance: explaining observer state status in the Arctic Council, Climatic Change, 176(50).

In 2015, Turkey, Greece, and Mongolia submitted applications for observer status but were also rejected without an official explanation. An interviewee¹⁷⁾I conducted two interviews (08.01.2024 / 28.02.2024) with Arctic Council representatives specifically for this conference paper presented in Bodø. Additionally, I incorporated analyses that emerged from 46 interviews conducted during my PhD research. from the Arctic Council suggested geopolitical considerations as a factor in these decisions.¹⁸⁾The Arctic Council observer states by acceptance dates: 1998: Germany, Netherlands, Poland, United Kingdom; 2000: France; 2006: Spain; 2013: China, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Singapore; 2017: Switzerland. https://arctic-council.org/about/observers/?utm_source=chatgpt.com. Accessed on 16 December 2024.

These patterns reveal underlying dynamics of geo-epistemology and knowledge monopolies that are rooted in imperialistic ideologies. By examining such decisions, we gain insights into how expertise is defined and who controls what is considered relevant knowledge within geopolitical bodies like the Arctic Council. As Andreeva and Rottem argue, active engagement in research not only advances academic knowledge but also aligns with foreign policy objectives and enhances visibility.¹⁹⁾Andreeva S & Rottem S. V (2024). How and why the Arctic Council survived until now – an analysis of the transition in chairship between Russia and Norway, The Polar Journal, 14(1): 229–246.

Building on the discussion of knowledge monopolization and geo-epistemology, Turkey’s application for observer status in the Arctic Council serves as a good example. In Turkish media, there was no coverage of Turkey’s application for observer status in the Arctic Council, nor of the subsequent rejection of its applications. Similarly, within the Arctic Council itself, information regarding applications and rejections of observer status remains sparse.²⁰⁾Knecht S (2015). New Observers Queuing Up: Why the Arctic Council should expand – and expel, The Arctic Institute, 20 April. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/new-observers-queuing-up/. Accessed on 21 April 2025. This lack of transparency appears to extend to some scientists and decision-makers who are unaware of these states’ applications.

An intriguing piece of feedback at a panel at the 2024 Arctic Congress in Bodø regarding Turkey’s observer application to the Arctic Council raised the question: How would Turkey contribute to the Arctic? On a practical level, the feedback emphasized that ministerial and official meetings are frequently held in remote areas, making accessibility challenging. Additionally, a shortage of facilities to accommodate all participants was cited as a reason to limit the number of observers.

This feedback on Turkey’s application is valid to some extent but also reflects underlying biases. The bias in the comment “What could Turkey contribute?” stems from an assumption that Turkey is a monolithic entity, failing to recognize the diversity within its scientific and critical political communities in opposition to the current regime which can be called démocrature.²¹⁾“Démocrature” is a fusion term combining democracy and autocracy. Similar is “electoral authoritarianism”.

This highlights how identity and geopolitics intersect to sustain the dominance of hegemonic political narratives in defining legitimacy in international governance. While Mediterranean countries like Italy, Spain, and France are observer states, their Arctic engagement has historically been framed within the context of their European identity and alignment with the broader Western bloc. Turkey’s Mediterranean identity, however, intersects with its perceived Middle Eastern identity and its Eurasian positioning. From an Orientalist perspective²²⁾Said E. W (1978). Orientalism. New York: Pantheon Books. Turkey is often perceived as a Middle Eastern country in terms of its identity, and Eurasian in terms of its aspirations. On the other hand, the acceptance of Asian countries to observer status reflects geo-economic and geopolitical considerations, beyond the relevant knowledge criteria. Essentially, the East is what the West makes of it.

Interviews and the literature reveal that the opacity of the application process and decision-making raises questions about the inclusivity and effectiveness of the Arctic Council. Inclusion is crucial for broadening knowledge, particularly on global issues like environmental protection and climate change. However, decisions regarding observer status seem to be more influenced by politics than by scientific or environmental factors.

Thus, geopolitical consideration is still at the forefront of knowledge production and accepting observers to the Council.²³⁾Rottem S. V (2020). The Arctic Council: Between Environmental Protection and Geopolitics, Singapore: Palgrave. The analyses also show that the field of Arctic IR often remains deeply Western and European-centric, adhering to a worldview rooted in cultural and regional perspectives inherited from colonial empires.²⁴⁾Barkawi T & Murray C & Zarakol A (2023). The United Nations of IR: power, knowledge, and empire in Global IR debates, International Theory, 15(3): 445–461. This approach limits the diversity of perspectives in the field and reinforces hegemonic views that may not capture the complexities of contemporary geopolitics.

Reimagining Knowledge and expertise instead of relevant epistemology

Such a rigid worldview, with its emphasis on spatial boundaries and established political positions, risks reinforcing a static, monolithic conception of knowledge rather than fostering the growth of expertise in the Arctic. At the end of The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus writes, “I leave Sisyphus at the foot of the mountain! One always finds one’s burden again…The struggle itself towards the heights is enough to fill a man’s heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy.”²⁵⁾Camus A (1942). Le Mythe de Sisyphe. Paris: Gallimard. Much like Camus’s imagining, which he presents as a rebellion against the futility of repetition; challenging the established expertise and methodologies in the Arctic and in International Relations may require a similar act of rebellion. Such reimagining is essential to break away from the repetitive paradigms since the Arctic is larger than the Arctic.

From the complex interplay between geo-epistemology, knowledge monopolies, and geopolitical dynamics, we can conclude that if the Arctic Council can be understood as a legitimate institution claiming to set standards based on knowledge and expertise, it should apply more explicit criteria to non-state observers and provide explanations for rejections. As examples, there are also other regional platforms who accept non-regional actors to their governance mechanisms to address issues. In this sense, for example, limited observer statues or dialogue partners, three-year partnership models from ASEAN, Pacific Islands Forum would be interesting to respond to the criticisms about the acceptance of observers and criteria and to be more inclusive.

We now live in a world where Qatar and Azerbaijan host COP meetings, and where Saudi Arabia, known for its outdoor air conditioning, is a signatory of the Svalbard Treaty and negotiates oil prices with Russia. It is therefore not possible to keep the Arctic isolated from the others, particularly given what it offers and what it faces. Thus, rather than hierarchy, heterarchy is more suitable for evaluating expertise and shaping the discourse of power.

Eda Ayaydin is a visiting Post-Doctoral Researcher at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at Ohio State University, a Teaching Fellow at the University of London Institute in Paris & Research Fellow at the Malaurie Institute of Arctic Research.